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Two competing investor groups are vying for majority control of Sherritt International, the Canadian miner that holds a 50% stake in Cuba’s flagship Moa nickel-cobalt joint venture, in a contest that could place U.S. capital in a position of indirect influence over Cuban mining assets for the first time in more than six decades. Gillon Capital, linked to former Trump administration official Ray Washburne, and a consortium assembled by Kyma Capital that includes Glencore and an unnamed U.S. investor have each proposed acquiring roughly 55% of Sherritt through recapitalization. Any deal would leave the Cuban state’s 50% share of the Moa operation untouched and faces a gauntlet of U.S. sanctions law, Cuban regulatory approval, and Sherritt’s own debt restructuring.

The Gillon offer emerged in May as a non-binding option agreement at a likely discount to Sherritt’s pre-announcement share price. The Kyma-led bid, disclosed this week, mirrors the 55% target but brings the commodity-trading heft of Glencore into the picture, signaling a strategic play for offtake and operational integration rather than pure financial engineering. Both proposals hinge on converting Sherritt’s existing debt into equity, a mechanism that would dilute current shareholders while injecting fresh capital into a company that has struggled with liquidity and cost overruns at its Canadian refining assets.

Sherritt’s 50% stake in the Moa Joint Venture, shared equally with the state-owned General Nickel Company, covers mining and initial processing in Holguín province. The resulting mixed sulfide concentrate is shipped to Sherritt’s refinery in Fort Saskatchewan, Alberta — the only significant cobalt refinery in North America and one of just three meaningful nickel refineries on the continent. That downstream capacity is the prize: it converts Cuban laterite ore into battery-grade cobalt sulphate and nickel products that feed Western electric-vehicle supply chains.

The strategic calculus extends well beyond the Moa deposit. As the United States and its allies accelerate efforts to decouple critical-mineral supply chains from Chinese dominance, domestic refining capacity for Class 1 nickel and cobalt has become a national-security priority. Sherritt’s Alberta plant represents rare permitted, operating infrastructure that cannot be replicated quickly. Control of that facility, even shared with a Cuban state partner, offers a foothold in a supply chain where the West is structurally short.

Yet the legal thicket is formidable. The Helms-Burton Act exposes any U.S. person or entity “trafficking” in property confiscated from American nationals to litigation in U.S. courts — a risk that has deterred direct investment in Cuban mining since 1996. While Sherritt is a Canadian company, a U.S.-controlled parent could trigger Title III liability. Additionally, any transfer of effective control requires Cuban government consent, and Havana has historically guarded its nickel sector as a strategic revenue pillar. OFAC licensing, CFIUS review, and the mechanics of restructuring Sherritt’s $300-million-plus debt stack add further layers of uncertainty.

If either bid succeeds, the outcome will be less a takeover of Cuban mines than a repositioning of North American refining leverage. The Cuban state retains its equity, its ore, and its veto. What changes is the capital and commercial alignment behind the only cobalt refinery on the continent — a shift that reflects how critical-mineral scarcity is rewriting the geopolitical rules for even the most sanctioned jurisdictions.

Read the full report at <a href="https://www.theenergypost.com/capital-estadounidense-disputa-el-control-de-sherritt-en-medio-de-la-batalla-por-los-minerales-de-cuba/" target="_blank" rel

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